Testing for Real Effects of Monetary Policy Regime Shifts by Carl E. Walsh
NEER WORKING PAPER SERIES
TESTING FOR REAL EFFECTS OF
MONETARY POLICY REGIME SHIFTS
Carl E. Walsh
Working Paper No. 2116




The research reported here is part of the NBERs research program in
Financial Markets and Monetary Economics. Any opinions expressed are
those of the author and not those of the National Bureau of Economic
Research.NBER Working Paper #2116
January 1987
Testing for Real Effects of
Monetary Policy Regime Shifts
ABSTRACT
Huizinga and Mishkin (1986) have recently proposed a simple method for
testing whether monetary policy regime changes have affected the ex-ante
real rate of interest. This paper shows that care must be taken in
choosing the set of variables on which to project the ex-post real rate if
inferences about the ex-ante real rate are to be drawn. It is shown that
Huizinga. and Mishkin's tests cannot distinguish between shifts in the real
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1. Introduction
One of the most important contributions of the rational expectations
revolution in macroeconomics has been that it has forced economists to
think about macro policy in terms of alternative policy rules or regimes.
Realizations of policy instruments determined within a fixed regime and
changes in the policy regime can have very different effects on both the
evolution of macro variables and on the observed structure of the economy.
Sargent (1976) has shown that it may be necessary to obtain data from more
than one policy regime in order to test hypotheses such as the neutrality
of money.
Sims (1982) has argued that the notion of a policy regime and of
arbitrary regime shifts is subject to logical problems.1" Despite this,
most economists seem willing to treat episodes like the Federal Reserve's
change in its operating procedures in late 1979 as policy regime shifts.
Following Sargent's suggestion, such episodes may provide evidence useful
for testing important macroeconomic hypotheses.
Huizinga and Mishkin (1986), for example, have recently argued that
monetary policy has important effects on the ex-ante real rate of interest.
As evidence,they cite apparent changes in the stochastic properties of the
real rate coinciding with major shifts in monetary policy regimes. More
specifically, they claim the real rate process shifted in October 1979, the
month the Fed changed operating procedures, in October 1982 when the Fed
deemphasized monetary aggregates, and in June 1920 when the Fed shifted to
a contractionary policy by raising the discount rate. Mishkin (1986) has
argued that these results suggest monetary policy, not fiscal deficits,
bears responsible for high real interest rates in the early 1980s.—2—
Because an understanding of the impact of monetary policy shifts on
real interest rates is important for many issues in macroeconomics, the
method used by Huizinga and Mishkin (hereafter H-M) deserves careful
scrutiny. It will be shown that their approach is theoretically unable to
separate shifts in the real interest rate process from shifts in the
inflation process. Hence, their procedure is likely to "find a shift in
the stochastic behavior of the ex-ante real rate when there is a monetary
policy regime shift, even if the true ex-ante real rate process is
completely invariant with respect to monetary policy. Evidence is
presented to suggest this may explain their finding of a real rate shift in
late 1982.
The flaw in the H-M methodology is shown formally by way of a simple
example in section 2, but the intuition can be grasped most easily by
considering the special case of an economy in which the real rate process
is, by assumption, completely invariant with respect to perceived monetary
policy shifts. In such an economy, the nominal interest rate will depend
on monetary policy via the expected rate of inflation. Since shifts in
monetary policy can influence the stochastic properties of inflation and
the nominal interest rate, such shifts will also affect the coefficient
obtained when the real rate is projected onto the nominal rate. Even
though the behavior of the real rate is invarient with respect to monetary
policy, the projection coefficient will shift in response to monetary
policy regime shifts. Yet it is just such shifts in projection
coefficients that H—H interpret as measuring shifts in the real rate
process.
When a variable y is projected onto a variable x, the resulting
projection coefficient depends on the stochastic properties of both x and—3—
y. Evidence of a shift in the projection coefficient does not, by itself,
allow one to infer that the y process has shifted.
There is, however, one case that would seem to be an exception to this
general conclusion. If the variable y is defined as the projection on x,
then it follows automatically that a change in the projection coefficient
will represent a change in the y process. It will be argued in section 2
that even if the real rate is defined by a projection equation, neutral
changes in the inflation process will appear to shift the real rate
process, a conclusion that casts doubt on the usefulness of defining the
real rate by a projection equation.
Section 3 provides some empirical evidence to suggest that the problem
outlined in Section 2 is of quantitative significance. Conclusions are
summarized in Section 4.
2.Shifts in the Real Rate Process
In order to discuss shifts in the real interest rate process, it is
necessary to carefully specify what is meant by the real rate process. Two
alternative approaches can be taken. One approach treats the real rate as
a function of its fundamental determinants. The other approach defines the
ex—ante real rate process as a projection equation./' In this section,
both approaches are discussed and it is shown that the H—M procedure will
incorrectly identify changes in the inflation rate process as changes in
the real rate process.
To first define the notation that will be used throughout, let rt
equal the ex-post (ex-ante) real return from time t to t÷1. The actual
(expected) rate of inflation from t to t+1 will be denoted
Finally, define as the nominal return from t to t+1. These variables-4-




Subtracting equation (1) from equation (2),
(\
.t .t '—I
where = —isthe expectational error in the market's forecast of
inflation.
Now suppose the ex-ante real rate of return is a function of a set of
fundamental exogenous variables. Let these be divided into three classes.
First, denote by a vector xt exogenous and predetermined determinants of r
that can be observed by the econometrician. 'Included in x, might be
factors such as the economy's capital stock,, but the current nominal
interest rate would not be contained in x since it is neither exogenous nor
predetermined. Second, let denote additional determinants of r that
are observable to private agents but are not observed by the econometrician
and that also potentially affect the expected rate of inflation. Finally,
let e denote the net effect of unobserved real rate determinants that have
no effect on inflation. For simplicity, I will assume that x, v, and e are
mutually orthogonal; the basic results of this section are not sensitive to
this assumption. Hypothesizing a linear structure, write
= + v + e= x + Ut,
(4)—5—




If x, is contained in the information set used to form expectations about
the expectational error will be orthogonal to Xtunderthe
assumption of rational expectations. Hence, consistent estimates of the
parameter vectorcan be obtained from the ordinary least squares
regression of r on x since x and u —areorthogonal. Thus, as Mishkin
(1983) has emphasized, any hypothesis about the ex—ante real rate of
interest that can be expressed in terms of restrictions on Bcanbe tested,
even though the ex—ante real rate is an unobservable variable.
In practice, of course, the correct elements of the x vector are
unknown, and, as with the specification of any regression equation, the
estimate of B will be influenced by any relevant variables that have been
left out of (5) and that are correlated with those variables that are
included in (5).In general, this might lead one to include in the ex—post
real rate regression any variable known at time t. Adding extraneous
variables will not affect the consistency of the least squares estimators.
Instead of testing a particular hypothesis about e under the
maintained hypothesis that the coefficient vector has remained constant
over the sample period, one might wish to investigate possible shifts in
the real rate process. That is, a change in the real rate process might be
defined as a shift in the coefficients in a regression of the real rate on
a set of information variables.One might then attempt to discover
whether major shifts in monetary policy affect the stochastic properties of
the real rate by testing for coefficient shifts coincident with monetary-6-
policy changes. In contrast to th case in which a restriction onis
being tested, testing for shifts in the coefficient vector require a more
careful consideration of the variables to include in the regression.
To see why, recall that the residual in (4) is equal to v6 + e, and
that Vt consists of factors that influence both the ex-ante real rate of
return and the expected rate of inflation but that are unobserved by the
econometrician. Suppose that the actual rate of inflation is given by
=xti+ Zy +vta
+e. (6)
In equation (6), z is a set of variables, known to private agents at time
t, that affect inflation but not the ex-ante real rate. The vector is
likewise observed by private agents at time t, but is not observed by the
econometrican. To simplify subsequent calculations, z is taken to be
orthogonal to x, v, and e.
Equations (1), (4) and (6) Imply that the nominal rate of interest is
given by
=x(+i)+ ZtY + v(S+c) + et. (7)
Now suppose the econometrican regresses the ex-post rate r on x and,
in order to capture the effects of some of the unobserved variables in v,
the nominal rate of interest. This is the procedure employed by H-.M.
Intuitively, (4) shows that re depends on v, and, from (7), i is correlated
with v. Therefore, including i should help to reduce the problem of




where a denotes the variance of the random variable s and, for simplicity,
z and v have been taken to be scalars.
Now assume that there is a change in a in equation (6). This
represents a pure change in the inflation process -—theprocess describing
the real rate, equation (5), is completely unaffected. However, as (8)
clearly shows, the change in awillaffect the coefficient on the nominal
interest rate in the ex-post real rate regression. Shifts inor
produce similar effects. It follows that evidence of shifts in the
coefficients in the regression of the ex-post real rate on a set of
variables which includes the nominal rate does not allow one to conclude
that a shift in the real rate process has occurred."
This illustrates that great care must be taken in choosing the
variables on which to project the ex—post real rate. Candidate variables
must be orthogonal to all excluded factors which affect inflation. The
nominal interest rate clearly fails this criterion.
If the exogenous and predetermined variables in x were known, a shift
in the real rate process could be tested by estimating equation (5). The
orthogonality between xt and u - insuresthat least squares will
provide consistent estimates of B.Theproblem, of course, consists in
correctly specifying the elements of x, and this leads to the second
approach to specifyfng the real rate process. This approach defines the
real rate process to be the projection of r on the set of available
information. Since the nominal rate is clearly inthisset, the real rate-8-
process would be defined by
e ** (9) =Pit+X,8 + U
whereu =v+e*.If changes in the real rate process are defined as
changes in the projection coefficients p, 8* and o, then it might appear
that the H—M procedure, by providing consistent estimates of the projection
coefficients, can provide a method for testing for shifts in the real rate
process.
This argument, however, is incorrect. Because the unobservable (to
the econometrician) variables in v. also affect expected inflation, i will
be correlated with the composite error term -ct
=vt+e
-
obtainedby substituting (9) into (3). In fact, making use of (6), it can
be shown that in the special case of scalar and orthogonal v, z and x, the
probability limit of the least squares projection coefficient on i in (9)
is
(+ )(s+ + + 'e
(10) 22 22 2 +°v+ +
Asequation (10) demonstrates, the estimate of p (and 8* also) will
depend on ,', and—allparameters which appear only in the equation
generating inflation. Hence, even if p, 8* and—theprojection
coefficients assumed to define the real rate —areunchanged, the estimated
coefficients on i and x will shift with changes in the parameters
describing the inflation process. Both alternative approaches to defining
the real rate process —asa function of fundamentals or as a projection
equation —implythat the H—M procedure runs the risk of misinterpreting—g -
pureinflation changes for changes in the real rate process.
When projecting one variable on another, the resulting projection
coefficient will shift if the behavior of either of the two variables
changes. Increased money growth volatility that affects the behavior of
nominal interest rates would alter the coefficient obtained by projecting
the ex—post real rate on the nominal rate. Such a coefficient shift,
however, does not allow one to conclude that the real rate process has
changed unless one tautologically defines such coefficient shifts to be
real rate process shifts. Such a definition, however, does not seem to be
a very useful one for understanding the real effects of monetary policy
regime shifts.
Any time a variable y is projected onto another variable x, the
projection coefficient will be a function of the stochastic processes
generating both y and x. All one can legitimately infer from evidence of a
projection coefficient shift is that either the x process, or the y
process, or both, changed. Only if further evidence shows that the x
process remained unchanged can one conclude that the y process changed.
3.Empjrical Results
The previous section has shown that testing for shifts in the real
interest rate process requires a careful consideration of the variables to
include on the right-hand side of a regression for the ex-post real rate.
Inclusion of a variable such as the nominal interest rate may cause the
real rate process to appear to shift whenever the stochastic behavior of
inflation changes, even if the underlying behavior ofthe real rate is
completely unaffected.
While the theoretical argument implies that great care must be taken-10-
in attempting to identify real rate process shifts, theory obviously cannot
determine whether or not real rate shifts were incorrectly identified in
the particular empirical study carried out by H-M. This section attempts
to partially address this issue.
H—M identify post-war shifts in the real rate process as having
occurred in October 1979 and October 1982. Both of these dates are
associated with changes in monetary policy and so, as seems reasonable, H—M
attribute the real rate shifts to the change in monetary policy. Using
one—month Treasury bill yields and one-month changes in the Consumer Price
Index, these real rate shifts are found by testing for coefficient shifts
in the following equation:
rt =a0+
a1i +a2_i +a3t2 +a4SUpplyti,
(11)
where supply. is the log of the relative price of fuel and related products
in the producer price index." H-M calculate Quandt likelihood ratios&'
for pairs of breakpoints around October 1979 and October 1982. These two
months were chosen because they were associated with changes in monetary
policy. The Fed shifted from a federal funds rate operating procedure to a
nonborrowed reserves procedure in October 1979, and during the October 1982
FOMC meeting, a decision was made to deemphasize monetary targeting. H-M
present —2 times the log of the Quandt likelihood ratio for all breakpoint
pairs (s, t) where s runs from April 1979 to April 1980 and t runs from
April 1982 to April 1983•L"TheQuandt statistic suggests that October
1979 and October 1982 are in fact the most likely dates for shifts in
equation (11).
The analysis of the previous section suggested that real rate—11—
regressions which include the nominal interest rate are particularly
susceptible to apparent shifts when the inflation process changes. To test
whether this problem may have affected H—M's results, the nominal rate was
dropped from equation (11) and the Quandt likelihood ratios were again
calculated for pairs of possible breakpoints around October 1979 and
October 1982. Minus twice these ratios are presented in Table 1.
The maximum value now occurs at (1979:10, 1983:04). This first
breakpoint at October 1979 coincides with the finding of H-M and serves to
support their view that the change in monetary policy operating procedures
on October 6, 1979 did have an impact on the behavior of the real rate of
interest. However, the second breakpoint, April 1983, does not correspond
to H—M's findings of an October 1982 break. The April date does agree,
however, with the results of Antoncic (1986) who finds a trough in the real
rate during April 1983.
The results in Table 1 do suggest that the problems with the H—M
procedure discussed in the previous section may be empirically important.
To further investigate this issue, anequa.tion for the rate of inflation
was estimated and used to test for breaks in the inflation process. To
maintain similarity with (11), the inflation equation includes the same
right hand variables as (11) withthe exception that is again excluded
from the regression. Table 2 reports minus twice the log of the Quandt
likelihood ratios for the inflation equation.
Quite significantly, the maximum value in Table 2 occurs at (1979:11,
1982:09). Both dates correspond closely to the real rate breakpoints
identified by H—M. Since the results in Table 1 do not support H-Ms
finding of a real rate shift in October 1982, the Table 2 results are quite
significant in that they suggest that the inflation process appears to have-12-
shifted in September 1982, just one month prior to the date H—M identify
with a real rate shift. Recall that is defined as the rate of inflation
from period t to t+1; if the inflation rate at time t was defined more
conventionally as the rate from t-1 to t, the breakpoint in the inflation
rate process would be dated at exactly October 1982. Since no shift in
late 1982 was indicated by the ex-post rate regression that excluded the
nominal rate, this evidence seems to suggest that the shift in the real
rate found by H-M in October 1982 may actually simply be a reflection of a
shift in the inflation process.
Further evidence on the dates of shifts in the real rate process can
be obtained by estimating equation (12), which includes only lagged values






Table 3 reports minus twice the log of the Quandt likelihood ratio. The
breakpoint pair with the maximal value is (1979:12, 1983:O4).'
Significantly, the second break, in April 1983, agrees exactly with the
results obtained by dropping the nominal rate from the H—M regression.
4. Conclusions
The empirical results of the previous section clearly indicate that
procedures for identifying process shifts are sensitive to the choice of
variables to include on the right—hand side of a projection equation. For
example, H—Ms conclusion that 1982:10, and not 1983:04, was the most
likely date for a shift in the real rate process depended on the inclusion
of the nominal rate of interest in their regression. This appears to have—13—
led them to identify the September 1982 shift in the inflation process as a
real rate shift.
Many important hypothesis in macroeconomics take the form of an
implied invariance across regime shifts. Hence, it is important to be able
to empirically identify the timing of shifts in variables such as the real
rate of interest. The analysis of this paper has shown that the problem of
omitted variables can lead to incorrect inferences if "process shift" is
interpreted to mean 'projection coefficient shift."
While the focus has been on the problems created by including the
nominal interest rate in a regression for the real rate of interest, the
same problems are created by the inclusion of any variable that is
correlated with omitted variables that affect the rate of inflation. Thus,
while the focus here has been on the nominal rate of interest, lagged rates
of inflation are also likely to give rise tosimilar problems. Thus, the
empirical results reported in Section 3 should only be taken as
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1.See also Sargent (1984).
2.That the real rate process might be defined by a projection
equation was suggested to me by the referee.
3.Note that this conclusion holds even if s =0;i.e. the factors
represented by v do not need to directly effect the ex—ante real rate.
Also, this result does not depend on the unobservability of re, as can be
seen by noting that (8) is independent of a2. The same point can be
illustrated using the model of Litterman and Weiss (1985, p. 145). The H—M
method would find apparant shifts in the real rate whenever a monetary
policy shift occurred, even though the real rate in the Litterman and Weiss
model is, by construction, exogenous with respect to monetary policy.
4. Huizinga and Mishkin explicitly recognize that the projection
coefficients they estimate will incorporate the effects of any ommitted
variables correlated with x (see pp. 235-236). This does not create a
serious problem for the H—M procedures, since a change in the stoch4ic—15—
behavior of the omitted variables will produce a shift in the projection
coefficients H-M estimate. The case not considered by H—M occurs when the
variables omitted from (4) also affect inflation.
5.For a complete description of the data, see Huizinga and Mishkin
(1986, pp. 238—239).I would like to thank John Huizinga and Rick Mishkin
for supplying me with their data.
6.If t1 and t2 are the breakpoints and I is the size of the entire
sample, the log of the Quandt statistic is given by t1lna1 +(t2-t1)lna2
+
(T—t2)lna3
—Tlna,where aisthe estimated standard error for the
regression estimated over the entire sample, and °i' a2and
a3arethe
estimated standard errors before the first break, between the two breaks,
and after the second break, respectively.
7.See Huizinga and Mishkin (1986: Table 3, page 246).




(1953:01—1979:12, 1980:1-1983:04) F(5,356)=12.13 .72 x 10
(1980:01-1983:04, 1983:05—1984:12) F(553)=2.81 .025
(1953:01-1979:12, 1983:05—1984:12) F(5,336)=6.03 .23 x 10-16-
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